Court Blocks Rule Requiring Federal Contractors to Disclose Labor Law Violations, But Okays Pay Transparency Rule

On October 24, 2016 the federal district court in Beaumont, Texas enjoined implementation of President Obama’s Executive Order 13673 and the enforcement of FAR Council regulations and U.S. DOL guidance requiring disclosures of labor law violations, which were scheduled to take effect on October 25, 2016.  The court found that the requirement to report labor law violations exceeded the Executive Branch’s authority and violated free speech and due process rights of federal contractors and subcontractors.  The court also halted the ban on pre-dispute arbitration agreements covering Title VII claims and tort claims relating to sex harassment.  However, on January 1, 2017 the Order’s pay transparency rules will take effect, requiring federal contractors to furnish wage statements each pay period stating hours worked, overtime hours worked, rate of pay and any additions and/or deductions from pay.

In August 2016 the FAR Council and the DOL issued a Final Rule and Guidance on E.O. 13673 titled Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces.  The Final Rule requires federal contractors and subcontractors that solicit a contract with the Federal Government estimated to exceed $500,000 to disclose all violations of 14 federal labor laws committed during a look-back period, including FLSA, OSHA, FMLA, ADA, ADEA, Title VII and the NLRA.  The Federal Government will consider these labor law violations and decide whether they are too serious, repeated, willful or pervasive to award or extend a contract.

Because this injunction is only preliminary and partial and an appeal or amended rule is likely, federal contractors and subcontractors cannot ignore E.O. 13673, the Final Rule or DOL Guidance.  If the injunction is dissolved, then contractors and subcontractors will be faced with disclosure duties covering a look-back period of one year that will gradually increase to three years.  In addition, no disclosures will be required in the six months following the Rule’s effective date for prospective contractors, and one year for prospective subcontractors.  This phase-in disclosure process is in response to the DOL’s recognition that contractors and subcontractors were not previously required to track and report federal labor law violations and need time to familiarize themselves with the Final Rule, set up protocols and create or modify internal databases to track covered labor law decisions, including administrative merits determinations, arbitral awards or decisions, and civil judgments.

As discussed above, the court did not enjoin the Executive Order’s pay transparency requirements taking effect January 1, 2017.  In addition, the DOL requires every federal contractor and subcontractor covered by E.O. 11246 to provide notice to applicants and employees that the employer will not discriminate based on questions, discussions, or disclosures about pay.  The contractor must post the Pay Transparency Nondiscrimination Provision either electronically or in conspicuous places available to the employee or applicant at the employer’s premises and include it in existing employee handbooks and manuals.  Sample DOL language is available at

On a somewhat related issue, the DOL issued its Final Rule implementing President Obama’s E.O. 13706, which mandates paid sick leave for employees of federal contractors.  Beginning January 1, 2017 the DOL will require a covered federal contractor to provide an employee with at least 56 hours per year of paid sick leave, or alternatively the contractor must permit an employee to accrue not less than one hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours worked under a covered federal contract.  An employee may use the paid sick leave for a physical or mental illness, injury or medical condition, obtaining diagnosis, care or preventive care, caring for the employee’s child, parent, spouse, domestic partner, or to seek counseling, relocation, assistance from a victim services organization or legal action for domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking.  If a labor agreement signed before September 30, 2016 applies to an employee’s work performed under a covered contract and provides the employee with fewer than 56 hours of paid sick time each year (or fewer than seven days, if the agreement refers to days rather than hours), the contractor must provide the difference between 56 hours and the amount provided under the existing agreement.  However, if a labor agreement signed before September 30, 2016 already provides for at least 56 hours per year of paid sick leave, the other requirements of the Executive Order and Final Rule, such as recordkeeping, notice and timing of pay, will not apply to the contractor until either the agreement terminates or January 1, 2020, whichever is sooner.

For assistance in complying with the Executive Orders, Final Rules or DOL Guidance on labor law violation disclosures, pay transparency or paid sick leave, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq. at 973-535-7129 or, or Nicole L. Leitner, Esq. at 973-387-7897 or

Regulations Require Paid Sick Leave for Federal Contractors

On September 29, 2016, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a final rule requiring federal contractors to provide employees with at least seven days of paid sick leave each year. This requirement applies to all new contracts.

What contracts must comply with the paid sick leave requirement?  Four types of contracts fall within the new sick leave requirement.  They are: 1) procurement contracts for construction covered by the Davis-Bacon Act; 2) service contracts covered by the Service Contract Act; 3) concession contracts; and 4) contracts in connection with Federal property or lands related to services for Federal employees and the general public.

What is a new contract?  The rule applies to new contracts, which is defined as a contract awarded or resulting from solicitations on or after January 1, 2017.  A contract prior to January 1, 2017 will also be considered a new contract if: 1) the contract is renewed; 2) the contract is extended, unless the extension arises from a term for a short term extension in the original contract; or 3) the contract is amended as a result of a modification outside the scope of the original contract.

How much paid sick leave must a federal contractor provide?  Employees working on covered, new contracts accrue one hour of paid sick leave for every thirty hours worked. Employers may also limit paid sick leave to 56 hours per year.  For administrative ease, an employer may “front-load” or provide the 56 hours at the beginning of the accrual year.  Special rules apply for carrying-over any unused paid sick leave to the following year.  The regulations also allow employers to implement a policy allowing forfeiture of any accrued, unused paid sick leave upon separation from employment.  However, if an employee is rehired within 12 months, the employer must reinstate accrued, unused paid sick leave.

What uses of paid sick leave are permitted?  The regulations provide that an employee may use paid sick leave for the following reasons:

  1. for the employee’s own physical or mental injury, injury, or condition
  2. for the employee to obtain diagnosis, care, or preventative care
  3. for the employee to care for a child, parent, spouse, domestic partner, or person in a family relationship for reasons relating to that person’s medical condition
  4. for reasons related to domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault

For more information on the Final Rule and implementing best practices with these regulations, please contact Brigette N. Eagan, Esq., Counsel in the firm’s Human Resources Practice Group at or 973-533-0777.

Third Circuit Deals Blow to Jersey City Ordinance Requiring PLAs on Privately Funded Projects in Exchange for Tax Abatements

Jersey City’s Municipal Code offers real estate developers generous tax exemptions that are designed to spur the City’s economic growth, but the tax incentives have strings attached. Specifically, to receive a tax exemption, even on a privately funded project, the developer must agree to use the City-approved project labor agreement (“PLA”), which is a pre-hire agreement that favors unionized contractors and subcontractors. On September 12, 2016, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated claims against Jersey City that its tax exemption ordinance mandating PLAs is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Now the case returns to the District Court for a determination whether Jersey City’s PLA requirement is unlawful. The Court was careful to explain that its ruling has nothing to do with public construction projects, and is limited to the City’s attempted regulation of privately funded projects. Associated Builders and Contractors v. City of Jersey City, No. 15-3166 (3rd Cir. Sept. 12, 2016).

By imposing the PLA requirement on privately funded projects that sought tax abatements, the Third Circuit found that Jersey City “require[d] that an employer negotiate with a labor union and that all employees be represented by that labor union as part of the negotiations— even if the developers, contractors, and subcontractors do not ordinarily employ unionized labor and the employees are not union members.” In addition, the City’s standard PLA requires that employers and unions agree not to strike or lock-out during construction, and agree to sponsor or participate in apprenticeship programs.

The Court of Appeals found that the three laws allegedly violated by Jersey City’s ordinance — the NLRA, ERISA and the Commerce Clause — “share the same threshold requirement before their constraints are triggered: that the allegedly unlawful act by the state or local government be regulatory in nature,” as opposed to action by a market participant. The Court determined that Jersey City is not a market participant because the City “is not selling or providing any goods or services with respect to Tax Abated Projects, nor acting as an investor, owner, or financier with respect to those projects.” Invoking Supreme Court precedent, the Court rejected the City’s claim that offering tax abatements gives the City a proprietary interest in the project. The Court found that the City acted instead as a market regulator and since the ordinance strips employers and employees of the economic weapons of strikes and lockouts, and relates to employee benefit plans, the City’s ordinance may indeed be preempted by the NLRA and by ERISA. Finally, by enacting “regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out of state competitors,” the ordinance arguably violates the dormant Commerce Clause.

Absent a request for rehearing or a petition for rehearing en banc, this case will return to the District Court for a determination whether the PLA requirements in the City’s tax exemption ordinance are enforceable. The larger questions are whether PLAs now in place on privately funded projects in Jersey City will remain in effect and, if not, whether this affects developers’ tax exemptions. Also an open question is whether the Third Circuit’s decision affects similar tax exemption ordinances in other municipalities that impose PLA requirements. Questions relating to this important decision and the path forward for developers in Jersey City and elsewhere in the state may be directed to any partner in our firm’s Labor Law Practice Group – James McGovern III, Patrick McGovern, Douglas Solomon, and John Vreeland.

The Monkey and the Cat: Second Circuit Adopts “Cat’s Paw” Theory of Liability for the Acts of a Non-Supervisory Employee in Title VII Retaliation Cases

On August 29, 2016, a unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revived a retaliation lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under the “cat’s paw” theory of liability. In Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Service, Inc., et al. (Case No. 15-3239), the Second Circuit held that an employer may be held liable under a cat’s paw theory of liability for an employee’s animus, regardless of the employee’s role within the organization, if the employer’s own negligence gives effect to that animus and causes the victim to suffer an adverse employment action. The decision brings the Second Circuit in line with several of its sister circuits in Fapplying the cat’s paw theory of liability in Title VII retaliation claims, including the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The cat’s paw theory of liability derives its name from one of Aesop’s fables, where a monkey persuades a cat to pull chestnuts from a fire where they are being roasted, promising him a share. As the cat removes the chestnuts – and in the process burning his paw – the monkey eats the nuts, leaving the cat with no food and a burnt paw. The cat was duped by the monkey, who benefited from the pains suffered by the cat. Cat’s paw liability now refers “to a situation in which an employee is fired or subjected to some other adverse employment action by a supervisor who himself has no discriminatory motive and intended to bring about the adverse employment action.” Because the supervisor, acting as an agent of the employer, has allowed themselves to be used “as the conduit of [the subordinate’s] prejudice,” the prejudice may be imputed to the employer.

In this case, the plaintiff, Andrea Vasquez, was employed by Empress Ambulance Service, Inc., as an EMT on an ambulance crew. Another Empress employee, Tyrell Gray, a dispatcher, frequently made romantic gestures and overtures to Vasquez, which she rejected. Gray also sent Vasquez a sexually explicit image via text message on work time. When Vasquez returned to the office from her shift, she notified her supervisor and began to prepare a formal complaint. Before Vasquez was able to finalize her complaint and meet with her supervisor and union representative, Gray began fabricating evidence that he and Vasquez had been involved in a consensual sexual relationship, asking a fellow co-worker to lie and doctoring text messages, which he provided to Empress to corroborate his fabricated story.

When Vasquez met with Empress and her union representative, a member of Human Resources stated that Empress had already reviewed Gray’s “evidence” and had concluded that she was having “an inappropriate sexual relationship” with him. Vasquez denied the allegations and asked to see the “evidence,” but she was not permitted to do so. Vasquez offered to show Empress her own cell phone to disprove the doctored text message history provided by Gray, but Empress declined the opportunity and terminated Vasquez for engaging in sexual harassment.

In reversing the District Court’s dismissal of the Complaint, the Second Circuit expressly adopted the cat’s paw theory of liability and addressed a second issue left open by prior case law: whether the cat’s paw approach would render an employer responsible for the animus of a co-worker, rather than a supervisor. The Second Circuit answered the question in the affirmative, applying general principles of agency law, and found that Vasquez could recover against Empress if she can show that Empress itself was negligent in relying on the discriminatory or retaliatory animus of a low-level, non-supervisory co-worker’s false allegations in making its decision to terminate her. Thus, the employer’s own negligence would provide an “independent basis” to treat the non-supervisory co-worker as an agent and hold the employer liable. The Court also cautioned that this approach will not make an employer liable “simply because it acts on information provided by a biased co-worker.” Rather, it is only when the employer “in effect adopts an employee’s unlawful animus by acting negligently with respect to the information provided by the employee [. . .]” that the animus could be imputed to the employer.

Following the Second Circuit’s decision, employers must be vigilant in how they handle accusations and information received by employees, regardless of their level within the organization and evaluate whether or not the employee has a retaliatory motive or other animus against their co-worker. Once an accusation has been made, employers must conduct a thorough and good faith investigation into the allegations to ensure that the employer is not acting on false or misleading information provided by an employee with an agenda. Employers must keep an open mind and maintain impartiality. Failure to do so will impute an employee’s retaliatory intent to the employer to support a claim under Title VII under the cat’s paw doctrine. Employers should consult with counsel to evaluate their employment and investigation policies to ensure conformity with this ruling.

For more information, please contact John C. Petrella, Esq., Chair of the firm’s Employment Litigation Practice Group at, or Dina M. Mastellone, Esq., Chair of the Human Resources Practices Group, at, or 973-533-0777.

Immigration Law Violations Occurring After November 2, 2015 Carry Heavier Penalties

Effective August 1, 2016 the Department of Justice is assessing higher penalties for employers that violate immigration laws. These penalties cover violations that occurred after November 2, 2015.  Specifically, the DOJ’s interim final rule increases penalties for a myriad of violations, including penalties for employing unauthorized workers and for technical Form I-9 paperwork violations. These increases are driven by the Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Final Rule which directs federal agencies periodically to increase their administrative penalties to account for inflation. With this increase, the minimum penalty for unlawfully employing a single unauthorized worker will increase from $375 to $539, and the maximum increases from $3,200 to $4,313. These fines apply to the employer’s first offense. For each additional offense, the penalty increases significantly and tops out at $21,563 per unauthorized worker.

The increases in penalties for Form I-9 paperwork violations are similarly stiff. The interim final rule increases the minimum fine from $110 to $216 per I-9 violation, and the maximum penalty increases from $1,100 to $2,156 for a single violation. Fines for I-9 paperwork violations are independent of any unlawful hiring violation. Since the I-9 fines apply to each discrete technical violation and increase with each additional offense, a growing business whose I-9 compliance process is out of compliance could face tens of thousands of dollars in fines if audited by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

In addition, the U.S. Department of Labor will also increase penalties for H-1B visa related violations. For example, misrepresenting material facts on the Labor Condition Application now carries a maximum penalty per violation of $1,782. In addition, an employer that displaces a U.S. employee in the period starting 90 days before and ending 90 days after it files an H-1B visa petition faces a maximum penalty of $35,000 to $50,758 per violation, if it does so in conjunction with certain willful violations.

Although these increases are touted as merely keeping pace with inflation, they are problematic for employers that have a poor track record of either ensuring their new hires are authorized to work in the U.S. or completing I-9 paperwork accurately for their new hires. Since these new penalties apply to violations that occurred as far back as November 2015, many in the employer community suspect that ICE has been delaying issuing fines for older violations until now, to recover the higher penalties. Also it is reasonable to anticipate that workplace audits will increase in number since ICE now has greater financial incentives to find employers out of compliance.

An audit with the assistance of counsel allows employers to detect and potentially correct any I-9 or other immigration compliance issues. It can also help to train the personnel responsible for immigration compliance, preventing errors in the future. For further information regarding how the ICE regulatory environment affects your business, recruiting, and hiring, and assistance with auditing your Form I-9 process, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., the Director of our Immigration Law Practice Group, at 973-535-7129 or

Allison Benz, a recent summer associate at Genova Burns LLC, assisted in the preparation of this blog post.

N.J. Supreme Court Rejects Defense of Federal Labor Law Preemption of CEPA Claim in Underlying Unpaid Wage Action

On August 16, 2016 the N.J. Supreme Court held, in a 6-0 opinion, that neither the federal Labor Management Relations Act nor the National Labor Relations Act preempts a claim under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) by a private sector employee who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement.  Puglia v. Elk Pipeline, Inc. (Case No. A-38-14).

Elk Pipeline employed Mr. Puglia, a union member, on a construction project in Camden. The project was subject to N.J. prevailing wage law and apparently as a cost savings measure, Elk reduced severely the wages of several laborers on the project, claiming that the employees were re-classified as apprentices.  Puglia complained to his supervisor and to Elk’s project manager that with the wage reduction, he was not being paid correct prevailing wages. An unhelpful fact for Elk was that its project manager commented to the project engineer that “the owner wanted to [f**k] with [Puglia] and wants to get rid of him.” In fact, no more than 11 months after Puglia first complained to Elk about his wages, Elk laid Puglia off, ahead of two less senior employees who were not laid off. Elk explained that the two less senior employees had relevant certifications that Puglia lacked. Puglia’s CEPA claim alleged that, by complaining internally about Elk’s failure to pay him proper prevailing wages, he engaged in protected whistleblowing activity, for which he lost his job. Elk moved for summary judgment, arguing that Puglia’s CEPA claim was preempted by federal labor law.

The trial court concluded that Puglia’s CEPA claim was preempted, by both the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), and based on Garmon preemption, a U.S. Supreme Court-based doctrine that holds that state-law claims that involve conduct arguably subject to Section 7 or Section 8 of the NLRA are preempted. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that Puglia’s claim was preempted by the LMRA, and by the NLRA under Garmon. The Appellate Division reasoned that the issues of Puglia’s contract seniority and Elk’s assertion that the Camden project was winding down required evaluation of the terms of Elk’s labor agreement.

The Supreme Court reversed and held that Puglia’s CEPA claim was not preempted by federal labor law. The issue the Court teed up for analysis and foreshadowed the Court’s conclusion was “whether complaints about violations of that minimum labor standard [of prevailing wages], and the concomitant State interest in curbing retaliation for such complaints, invoke preemption concerns.”  The Court analyzed Puglia’s CEPA complaint to determine whether it required an interpretation of the CBA and found that it did not. “Whether Puglia performed a whistleblowing activity in reporting the alleged failure by Elk to abide by Prevailing Wage Act requirements, and whether Elk retaliated against Puglia for doing so are factual questions, untied to any interpretation of the CBA.” The Court dismissed Elk’s best argument — that Puglia’s complaint depended on interpreting the labor agreement — and strained to find no contract issue. “It is far from clear that Puglia claimed a violation of the CBA in [his complaint]. He was making a factual allegation: He was more senior than other employees who were not let go. … That Puglia mentioned seniority in his deposition does not alter the substance of his claim. Nor does it inject a question of CBA interpretation into the factual questions at the heart of a CEPA claim. … Having a claim under the CBA does not void state-law remedies that are independent of the CBA. The employer’s attorney cannot change that by the course of his questioning at a deposition.” Despite Puglia’s claim that he was laid off out of seniority order, the Court still determined that it was “unclear” that he was claiming a contract violation. The Court gave no weight to Elk’s argument that the labor contract permitted Elk to lay Puglia off ahead of more junior employees and therefore Puglia’s layoff was dictated by the labor contract, and not retaliatory. Turning to Garmon preemption, the Court agreed with Elk “that Puglia’s conduct was at least arguably protected under Section 7” of the NLRA.  However, the Court determined it could not find that “Puglia’s CEPA claim is identical to the claim that he could have, but did not, present to the Board.” The Court explained, “[W]e believe that when the State’s interests in enforcing CEPA in a factual setting like this one — whistleblowing activity arising out of a prevailing wage dispute — are balanced against any potential interference with the federal labor scheme, the State’s interests win out. New Jersey’s interest in enforcing CEPA runs deep.” The Court concluded with this syllogism: “If an employee can allege a violation of those state minimum labor standards without being preempted by federal law, then it follows that allegations of retaliatory discharge based on whistleblower conduct in response to a violation of those standards should not be preempted.”

This decision indicates that rarely if ever will this Court find that a CEPA claim based on an alleged violation of N.J. wage laws is preempted by federal labor law, no matter how many labor contract issues are pled or implicated. A major concern for N.J. businesses flowing from this decision is the proliferation of claims and litigation, since this holding confirms that union-represented employees like Mr. Puglia can prosecute claims of retaliatory discharge and get three bites at the apple — in the contractual grievance-arbitration procedure, before the NLRB, and in state court under CEPA.

Questions relating to this important decision may be directed to any partner in our firm’s Labor Law Practice Group. Our Group’s attorney roster can be accessed at


Appellate Division Finds c.78 Health Benefits Contributions Requirements Do Not Apply to Public Sector Disability Retirees

Last month, in Brick Twp. PBA Local 230 v. Twp. of Brick, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey confirmed that N.J.S.A. 40A:10-21.1, P.L. 2011, c. 78, § 42, more commonly known as Chapter 78, does not require ordinary disability or accidental disability retirees of public employers to make premium payments for health insurance benefits.

Chapter 78, concerning public employee pension and health care benefits, was passed in recognition of “serious fiscal issues” confronting the State and the underfunding of the pension system. It implemented various changes to pension and health care benefits such as increased required contributions from public employees and suspension of cost-of-living adjustments.  Among these reforms included requirements for certain retirees to pay contributions toward their health benefits in retirement.

In Brick, the Township had required a former police employee, who had retired due to a disability he had sustained while on duty in 2011, to continue making health insurance premium contributions in order to maintain his retiree health benefits coverage. The trial court concluded that Chapter 78 exempted only those employees with 20 or more years of service on its effective date from having to make contributions toward health benefits in retirement. Due to the fact that the employee had served only 19 years, the trial court believed that his obligation to make contributions was required by Chapter 78.

On appeal, the Appellate Division considered “whether Chapter 78 applies to government employees who receive disability retirement benefits.” The Appellate Division opined that the clear language of Chapter 78 does not require that contributions be made by those who retire on disability pensions even if they have less than 20 years of pensionable service. The Court found support for its conclusion based on the fact that the Legislature had designated different statutory sections for employees disabled while at work, which was further supported by the legislative history of Chapter 78. Thus, the Court reasoned that while ordinary retirement is linked to a member’s age or years of service, disability retirement is not predicated on length of service or age, but awarded because of an employee’s disability.

Thus, the opinion suggests that Chapter 78 contributions requirements apply with respect to active public employees and those who retire based on meeting the service requirements. In contrast, those who are forced to retire on an ordinary disability or accidental disability retirement are exempt from making premium payments for health insurance benefits.

If you have any questions or for more information regarding Chapter 78 health benefits or the impact of other laws affecting public employers, please contact Joseph M. Hannon, Esq., or Brett M. Pugach, Esq., in the Firm’s Labor Law Practice Group.

IRS Proposes Restrictions on Employer Opt-Out Payments for ACA Coverage Waivers

In early July the IRS issued proposed regulations addressing the effect that employer payments to employees who waive employer-sponsored health coverage, known as Opt-Out Payments, have on determining whether an ACA-covered employer must pay an ACA penalty known as the Affordability Penalty. Generally, the proposed regulation will apply to Opt-Out Payments adopted after December 16, 2015, but there will be a phase-in period for Opt-Out Payments in labor agreements.

By way of background, ACA-covered employers are subject to a monthly Affordability Penalty for each full-time employee who (1) is required to pay more than 9.66% (indexed for 2016) of the employee’s household income to purchase self-only coverage under the employer’s health plan (“employee premium payment”) and (2) instead purchases individual coverage through an ACA exchange. In determining the amount of the employee premium payment and whether the affordability standard is satisfied, the proposed regulations would allow the employer to exclude the value of any Opt-Out Payment from the employee premium payment, but only where receipt of the Opt-Out Payment is conditioned on the employee’s (1) declining employer-sponsored coverage and (2) providing reasonable evidence that the employee and all other individuals for whom the employee expects to claim a personal exemption deduction have minimum essential coverage (other than coverage in the individual market, whether or not obtained through an ACA exchange).  This example illustrates when the value of an Opt-Out Payment would be excluded in calculating the employee premium payment: Employer offers its employees coverage under a plan that requires Employee to contribute $3,000 for self-only coverage. Employer also makes available to Employee a payment of $500 if Employee (1) declines to enroll in the plan and (2) provides reasonable evidence that Employee and all other members of B’s expected tax family are or will be enrolled in minimum essential coverage through another source (other than coverage in the individual market, whether or not obtained through the Marketplace). The Opt-Out Payment provided by Employer is a conditional Opt-Out Payment as defined under the regulations, and, therefore, Employee’s required contribution for self-only coverage under the plan is $3,000 since the $500 Opt-Out Payment is disregarded.

On the other hand, the value of an unconditional Opt-Out Payment (i.e., Opt-Out Payments conditioned only on waiving coverage) must be included in the calculation of the employee premium payment in determining affordability.  Therefore, any unconditional Opt-Out Payment will increase the employee premium payment, and make it less likely that the premium payment will come below the 9.66% household income percentage limit. Under the same facts as in the example above, except that eligibility for the Opt-Out Payment is unconditional, the $500 Opt-Out Payment increases the employee premium payment from $3,000 to $3,500, regardless of whether the employee accepts or declines the employer’s offer of coverage.

The proposed regulations are subject to public comment and our firm will continue to monitor and report on any developments. In the meantime, we recommend that ACA-covered employers review their current and planned Opt-Out Payment arrangements to determine how these payments will be treated under the proposed regulations and what adjustments must be made to avoid ACA penalties.  If you have any questions or for more information regarding the impact of the proposed regulations or ACA requirements generally on your organization, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., or Gina M. Schneider, Esq., in the Firm’s Employee Benefits Practice Group.

NLRB General Counsel Seeks to Prohibit Employers from Unilateral Withdrawal of Union Recognition

The National Labor Relations Board’s General Counsel recently released Memorandum GC 16-03 (May 9, 2016), proposing to make it more difficult for an employer to withdraw recognition of an incumbent union. This memorandum directs the Board’s regional offices to treat an employer’s withdrawal of union recognition without a Board-supervised election as a violation of the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”). Under the new rule proposed by the memorandum, an election would be required even if the employer possesses objective evidence that a union has lost majority support. This is a departure from the standard previously established by the Board in the seminal case of Levitz Furniture Company of the Pacific, Inc., 333 NLRB 717 (2001).

The Board rejected a similar proposal by the General Counsel fifteen years ago in Levitz. Before Levitz, an employer could unilaterally withdraw recognition of an incumbent union based on a good faith belief concerning the union’s loss of majority support. The Board in Levitz continued to allow unilateral withdrawal of union recognition, but required objective evidence of the union’s loss of majority support before withdrawal could occur. However, the Board left open the possibility of revisiting the issue if its revised standard did not prove effective for the purposes of the Act.

The General Counsel now wishes to revisit the issue, stating that the Levitz standard has proven problematic. The General Counsel proposes that the Levitz standard has failed to promote stable bargaining relationships and negatively impacts employees’ ability to make decisions regarding union representation. Under Levitz, an employer’s basis for unilateral withdrawal of union recognition could still be challenged by a union through filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board.  The General Counsel proposes that such charges have resulted in years of unnecessary litigation. The General Counsel further proposes that the new requirement of Board-supervised elections will benefit employers, employees, and unions alike by mandating a fair and efficient mechanism to determine whether an incumbent union actually retains majority support.

The General Counsel’s new proposal seeks to eliminate unilateral withdrawals of union recognition so that an employer can only withdraw recognition following a Board-supervised “RM” or “RD” election. An RM election follows a petition made by the employer to the Board. Such a petition can be made if the employer has a good faith doubt about the incumbent union’s majority support. An RD election follows a petition made by  employees to the Board. The employer cannot solicit or substantively assist employees in creating or signing such a petition. Any involvement by the employer involving more than ministerial assistance will automatically taint the petition and render it and any resulting election invalid. The majority of employees who vote in either type of election must vote against the union in order for an employer to withdrawal recognition.

Regardless of whether the General Counsel’s new proposal is adopted by the Board, employers should proceed with caution. Even before the issuance of this memorandum, the Board was skeptical of unilateral withdrawals of union recognition, and it has been difficult to establish the type of evidence necessary for withdrawal to be successful. As a result, it has been a safer practice to request a Board-supervised election. With the issuance of this memorandum, regional offices will now treat unilateral withdrawals of union recognition as violations of the Act. Even if the Board were to ultimately reject the General Counsel’s proposal, it would only be after lengthy and costly litigation on the issue.  Moving forward, employers should seek experienced counsel before making decisions in this regard.

For more information, please contact James J. McGovern, III, Chair of the Labor Law and Alcohol & Regulated Products Law Practice Groups, Genova Burns LLC, at

Your Credit is No Good Here: Philadelphia Becomes Latest Jurisdiction to Make It Unlawful to Use Credit Information in Employment

On June 7, 2016, Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenney signed into law Philadelphia Bill No. 160072, which amends Philadelphia’s “Fair Practices Ordinance: Protections Against Unlawful Discrimination,” Chapter 9-1100, et seq. of the Philadelphia Code.  Employers comprised of one or more people are covered by the Ordinance, which, as amended, prohibits an employer from procuring, or seeking a person’s cooperation or consent to procure, credit information regarding an employee or applicant in connection with hiring, discharge, tenure, promotion, discipline or consideration of any other term, condition or privilege of employment.  Philadelphia’s Ordinance follows other several other jurisdictions, including New York City, which have enacted similar laws.

The ordinance does provide some exceptions to its anti-discrimination provisions, which guide businesses seeking to utilize credit information in lawful ways.  These exceptions include allowing business to seek credit information if the information must be obtained pursuant to state or federal law, or if the specific job the employer seeks employee credit information for:

  • requires the employee to be bonded under City, state, or federal law;
  • is supervisory or managerial in nature and involves setting the direction or policies of a business or a division, unit or similar part of a business;
  • involves significant financial responsibility to the employer, including the authority to make payments, transfer money, collect debts, or enter into contracts, but not including handling transactions in a retail setting;
  • requires access to financial information pertaining to customers, other employees, or the employer, other than information customarily provided in a retail transaction; or
  • requires access to confidential or proprietary information that derives substantial value from secrecy.

However, if an employer relies on the credit information either in whole or in part when considering adverse action in these instances, it must disclose its reliance thereon and provide the particular information upon which it relied. Employers are also required to give the employee or applicant a chance to explain the circumstances prior to making an adverse decision.

Employer Takeaways: 

  • Employers should evaluate their hiring and internal employment processes to ensure it complies with the new ordinance and with the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (and local iterations).
  • If a credit check is done in certain circumstances, the employer should disclose its reliance and should allow for any explanation or clarification on behalf of the employee or applicant.

For more information regarding the potential impacts of this legislation or how your business can prepare to develop a compliant credit-check policy, please contact Dina M. Mastellone, Esq., Chair of the firm’s Human Resources Practice Group, at or 973-533-0777.