September 18 Deadline Set By U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for Employers to Use Revised Form I-9

Currently, every employer that recruits, hires, or refers employees for a fee in the U.S. is required to complete the Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification process within three days of a new employee’s hiring.  On July 17 the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services approved a revised version of Form I-9.

The revised Form I-9 changes the prior form by, among other things, adding Consular Reports of Birth Abroad to the List of Acceptable Documents. Two other clarifications relate to the timing of completion. First, Section 1 of Form I-9 must be completed no later than the first day of employment, as opposed to a previous command that it must be completed “no later than the end of the first day of employment.” Second, persons employed for fewer than three days must present their original I-9 documentation to the employer no later than the first day of employment. The employer must still complete its review of the employee’s employment eligibility documentation within three business days of hiring.

No later than September 18, 2017, all U.S. employers must use the new Form 1-9.  Employers may continue using the prior Form I-9 through September 17, 2017 but should prepare to modify their hiring process to include the revised Form I-9.  Alternatively, employers may choose to use the new Form I-9 right away.  For any existing Form I-9s, employers must continue to comply with the existing separate filing and document retention rules.

The new Form I-9, its instructions, supplements, and translations are available for download here.

For any questions on the new Form I-9 and the I-9 employment eligibility verification process, contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the firm’s Labor Law Practice Group, at pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com, or by phone at 973-535-7129.

Hawaii Court Enjoins Trump Travel Ban For Excluding Non-Immediate Family Members of US Persons and DHS-Approved Refugees

In June the Supreme Court enforced temporarily President Trump’s travel ban to the extent it excludes persons without a “bona fide relationship” to a person or entity in the U.S. The Court expressly identified wives and mothers-in-law as persons who have a bona fide family relationship to a person in the U.S.  Following the Court’s decision, the Trump administration interpreted “bona fide relationship” narrowly, to include only fiancés, spouses, children, parents and siblings of the U.S. person. On July 13 a federal judge in Hawaii loosened the travel ban by entering a nationwide injunction that orders the Trump administration to exempt from the ban grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the U.S. U.S. District Judge Derrick Watson criticized the Administration’s narrow definition of bona fide family relationship as “the antithesis of common sense,” which “dictates that close family members be defined to include grandparents.”

Additionally, Judge Watson enjoined enforcement of the ban to the extent it excludes from entry refugees who have formal assurance from a U.S. resettlement agency. Judge Watson reasoned that such assurance “meets each of the Supreme Court’s touchstones: it is formal, it is a documented contract, it is binding, it triggers responsibilities and obligations, including compensation, it is issued specific to an individual refugee only when that refugee has been approved for entry by the Department of Homeland Security, and it is issued in the ordinary course, and historically has been for decades…Bona fide does not get any more bona fide than that.”

Immediately, the Justice Department appealed Judge Watson’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit and simultaneously filed motion papers with the Supreme Court requesting clarification. In its motion, the Justice Department argues that Judge Watson’s interpretation of the travel ban “empties the Court’s decision of meaning,” because it includes “not just ‘close’ family members, but virtually all family members…Treating all of these relationships as ‘close familial relationship[s]’ reads the term ‘close’ out of the Court’s decision.” The Justice Department asked the Court to stay the effective date of the Hawaii court’s order until the Court resolved the motion to clarify the Court’s June ruling. The Justice Department’s motion, which remains pending, may be viewed here.

If you would like to discuss the implications of the travel ban and the various court decisions affecting the ban for your employees, your hiring plans, and your business, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the Firm’s Immigration Law Practice at 973-535-7129 or at pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com.

Jersey City’s PLA Ordinance Found Preempted by NLRA and ERISA and Void Ab Initio

On June 15 U.S. District Court Judge Wigenton determined that Jersey City’s ordinance, in effect since 2007 and providing for tax abatements for real estate developers that sign Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act and void ab initio. The Jersey City Ordinance mandated that tax abatement recipients sign PLAs that contain no-strike and no-lockout provisions and therefore Jersey City’s Ordinance “directly intrudes on §7 and §8 of the NLRA.” The Court also held that the PLA ordinance’s attempt to regulate the operation and reporting of apprenticeship programs intruded upon and therefore was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Associated Builders and Contractors Inc. v. Jersey City, No. 14-5445 (D.N.J. 2017).

This order is the most recent development in the action’s two-year history, as the case has bounced from court to court. In August 2015 the Contractors association, made up of non-union or “merit shop” contractors, brought suit alleging that Jersey City’s PLA ordinance was preempted by federal law. In August 2015 the District Court dismissed the complaint finding that Jersey City acted as a market participant, and not as a market regulator, and therefore the federal preemption doctrine did not apply to the ordinance. An appeal to the Third Circuit followed and in June 2016 the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that Jersey City was, in fact, a market regulator in its enforcement of the PLA ordinance. The Third Circuit found that the preemption analysis should be applied to the ordinance and remanded the case back to the District Court to apply the preemption analysis. Associated Builders & Contractors Inc. v. Jersey City (3d Cir. 2016). On remand, the Contractors association moved the District Court for judgment on the pleadings. Judge Wigenton granted the motion, voided the ordinance ab initio and ruled that “enforcement of the PLA Ordinance on any tax-abated project is enjoined.”

The practical impact of this ruling is to level the playing field for non-union and unionized developers and construction contractors competing for work on tax-abated projects. The Contractors association claimed that the PLA ordinance had the effects of setting 100% of the tax-abatement project work aside for 15% of the construction workforce, and driving up construction costs, which Jersey City’s taxpayers had to bear in the form of tax abatements. Now, Jersey City cannot require developers or construction contractors to sign PLAs with the Hudson County Building and Construction Trades Council in exchange for tax abatements and the opportunity to work on tax-abated projects. The Court voided the PLA ordinance ab initio, not prospectively. This suggests that on tax-abated projects that are now under way with PLAs in place, general contractors will revisit the process for selecting subcontractors with more discretion to select non-union subcontractors to perform project work.

Also an open question is how Judge Wigenton’s decision will affect similar tax-abatement ordinances in other municipalities that impose PLA requirements. Questions relating to this important decision and the path forward for developers and contractors in Jersey City and elsewhere in the state may be directed to any partner in our firm’s Labor Law Practice Group – James McGovern III, Patrick McGovern, Douglas Solomon, and John Vreeland.

SCOTUS Lifts Injunctions Against Trump Travel Ban for Aliens Unable to Establish Bona Fide Relationship with a U.S. Person or Entity

On June 26, the Supreme Court granted the Trump Administration’s petitions for certiorari and agreed to review next term the Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ decisions that affirmed broad injunctions against enforcement of the President’s second Executive Order on U.S. entry by foreign nationals. In the meantime, in a per curiam decision, the Court granted in part the Administration’s request to lift the lower courts’ injunctions against the travel ban affecting nationals of six predominantly Muslim countries, the 50,000-person refugee cap, and the suspension of the refugee program “with respect to foreign nationals who lack any bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” The Court will hear argument on these consolidated cases in October 2017.

The Supreme Court left in place the lower courts’ injunctions “only with respect to parties similarly situated to Doe, Dr. Elshikh, and Hawaii. In practical terms, this means that §2(c) [of the second Executive Order] may not be enforced against foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. All other foreign nationals are subject to the provisions of EO-2.”

The Court defined “bona fide relationship” as including individuals with a “close familial relationship,” including a wife or a mother-in-law. For entities, the relationship “must be formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading EO-2.”  This category includes a student who has been admitted to a U.S. university, a person who accepted a job offer with a U.S. employer, and a lecturer invited to address an American audience. The Court stated that the same “bona fide relationship” test will apply to a foreign national who seeks entry to the U.S. as a refugee, regardless of the 50,000- person cap.

Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Thomas stated that he would “grant the government’s applications for a stay in their entirety” and agreed “with the Court’s implicit conclusion that the Government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits—that is, that the judgments below will be reversed.” The Administration can therefore rely on at least three solid votes to overturn the injunctions in their entirety next fall.

If you would like to discuss the current status of the President’s Executive Order, and the implications of the Executive Order and the Court’s decision for your employees, your hiring plans, and your business, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the Firm’s Immigration Law Practice at 973-535-7129 or at pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com.

Fourth and Ninth Circuits Sink Trump Travel Ban as Prelude to High Court Review

In the most recent judicial setbacks to President Trump’s Executive Order earlier this year suspending the U.S. entry of aliens from six Muslim-majority countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen), reducing the number of refugees allowed entry in 2017 to 50,000, indefinitely and then temporarily barring the admission of Syrian refugees, and suspending the Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days, on May 25 the Fourth Circuit en banc enjoined nationally enforcement of the Executive Order. Although the Justice Department argued that the Order’s primary purpose is advancing national security, the court, with three of the 14 judges dissenting, remained unconvinced that the travel ban had “more to do with national security than it does with effectuating the President’s promised Muslim ban.” The Fourth Circuit found that the Order “speaks with vague words of national security, but in context drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination.” The opinion referenced statements that President Trump made in 2016 while on the campaign trail, which the court found supported its finding that the Executive Order was religiously motivated and violated the Constitution’s Establishment Clause. However, the court vacated the lower court’s injunction to the extent it enjoined the President. International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump.

On June 12 the Ninth Circuit in a per curiam decision by a three-judge panel, also upheld a lower court’s nationwide injunction against enforcement of the travel ban, but on the separate grounds that the Executive Order violated U.S. immigration law. The court stated that the revised travel ban “exceeded the scope of authority delegated to [the President] by Congress.” The panel held that by broadly prohibiting entry by all persons from the listed countries, the Executive Order is too broad and ignores important factors, such as the alien’s working arrangements, family matters and access to U.S. medical care. The Ninth Circuit did not address Establishment Clause issues, as the Fourth Circuit did. Instead, its major concern was that “the order does not provide a rationale explaining why permitting entry of nationals from the six designated countries under current protocols would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” However, the court vacated the injunction against the President and against the Government’s conducting internal reviews of security risks posed by nationals of the listed countries and the refugee program. Hawaii v. Trump.

The Supreme Court must now decide whether to hear the Administration’s appeal from the Courts of Appeals decisions this term. Most recently, in view of the current non-enforcement of the travel ban, on June 14 the President revised the 90-day ban on travelers and the 120-day ban on refugees to ensure they do not expire in the interim and will take effect 72 hours if and after the Administration prevails in having the injunctions lifted.

If you would like to discuss the implications of the Executive Order and these court decisions for your employees, your hiring plans, and your business, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the Firm’s Immigration Law Practice at 973-535-7129 or at pmcgovern@nulllgenovaburns.com.

NYC Fast Food Employers Beware – Strict “Fair Workweek” Laws Are Coming December 1st

On May 30, 2017, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio signed a bill enacting four laws, together called the Fair Workweek legislation package, aimed at creating more predictable work schedules for NYC’s fast food workers.  The laws go into effect on December 1, 2017.

The first law requires that the fast food employer provide written notice to the fast food employee of the employee’s work schedule, including regular and on-call shifts, 14 days before the worker’s first day of the new schedule.  The written notice must be posted in a conspicuous place at the workplace that is readily accessible and visible to all employees and transmitted to each employee, including via e-mail, if e-mail is regularly used to communicate scheduling information. Modification to the employee’s work schedule within 14 days of the first day the schedule begins will result in employer penalties ranging from $10 to $75 depending on the nature and timing of the modification. The penalty is paid directly to the affected employee.

The second law mandates a minimum amount of time between a fast food worker’s shifts.  A fast food employer will no longer be permitted to schedule a worker for two shifts with fewer than 11 hours between the end of the first shift and the beginning of the second shift when the first shift ends the prior calendar day or spans two calendar days. However, the worker may request or consent in writing to working back-to-back shifts with fewer than 11 hours between. Absent such request or consent, the employer will be subject to a $100 penalty each time the employee works such back-to-back shifts.

The third law prohibits the fast food employer from hiring new employees, including subcontractors, to work regular or on-call shifts before exhausting its current workforce. Under the new law, when shifts become available, the fast food employer must post a notice in a conspicuous and accessible location for at least three calendar days, and transmit the notice directly to each employee that states, among other things, the number of shifts offered, the schedule of the shifts, whether the shifts will occur at the same time each week, the length of time required for coverage, and the number of workers required for coverage. Assuming these conditions are met, the employer may look to outside employment only if none of the current fast food employees accept the open shift.

Finally, the fourth law allows a fast food employee to authorize the employer to deduct voluntary contributions from the employee’s paycheck and to remit the payment directly to the employee’s designated non-profit organization. The deduction must be at least $6.00 and only once per pay period.

New York City follows San Francisco and Seattle as the third major city to enact Fair Work Week legislation. To understand how the Fair Workweek legislation package affects your fast food business and your employees, please contact Nicole L. Leitner, Esq., a member of the Wage & Hour Compliance Practice Group, at (973) 387-7897 or nleitner@nullnullgenovaburns.com, or John Vreeland, Esq., Chair of the Wage & Hour Compliance Practice Group and a Partner in the Labor Law Practice Group, at (973) 535-7118 or jvreeland@nullnullgenovaburns.com.

High Court Agrees Pension Plans Sponsored by Church-Affiliated Hospitals Are ERISA-Exempt and Upholds Decades of IRS, PBGC and DOL Guidance

In a much-anticipated decision, on June 5 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a pension plan sponsored by a religious affiliated nonprofit hospital qualifies as an ERISA-exempt church plan even though the plan was not initially established by a church. In this decision the Court reversed three consolidated decisions by the Third, Seventh and Ninth Circuits holding that defined benefit pension plans initially established and sponsored by church affiliated nonprofit hospitals and healthcare facilities were not ERISA-exempt church plans specifically because they were not initially established by a church.  These courts held that since the church plan exemption did not apply, the plans must comply with ERISA’s funding, participation, vesting, reporting and disclosure rules.  In doing so, the Court affirmed long-standing guidance by the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation that ERISA’s church-plan exemption applies to plans sponsored and maintained by religious affiliated nonprofit hospitals regardless of whether a church initially established the plans.  Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton.

The Court focused on the plain meaning of ERISA’s church plan exemption and noted that while the term “church plan” was initially defined in ERISA to include only those plans “established and maintained . . . for its employees . . . by a church or by a convention or association of churches,” the definition was later amended to include additional plans.  The Court found that Congress specified that “for purposes of the church-plan definition, an ‘employee of a church’ would include an employee of a church-affiliated organization (like the hospitals here)” which the Court referred to as principal-purpose organizations. The Court found that Congress supplemented ERISA’s definition of church plan with the following provision: “A plan established and maintained for its employees . . . by a church or by a convention or association of churches includes a plan maintained by an organization . . . the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both, for the employees of a church or a convention or association of churches, if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.”  In effect, the Court held, “The church-establishment condition thus drops out of the picture.”

While the benefit plans at issue in this case were defined benefit pension plans, this holding has broad application to all benefit plans that are established by a principal-purpose organization and would otherwise be subject to ERISA’s funding, participation, vesting, reporting and disclosure rules.

For more information about this decision and its impact on your organization and your employee benefit plans, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com or Gina M. Schneider, Esq., gmschneider@nullgenovaburns.com in the Firm’s Employee Benefits Practice Group.

Third Circuit Stymies Employer’s Attempt to Force FLSA Overtime and Meal Break Pay Claims into Collectively Bargained Arbitration

Earlier this month, in a 2-1 decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that certified nursing assistants covered by a collective bargaining agreement are not required to arbitrate their FLSA claims before seeking court relief despite a mandatory arbitration clause in their labor agreement. The assistants claimed that their shift differentials should be included in the calculation of their overtime pay and challenged the deductions from their pay for meal breaks they did not take. The Third Circuit held that resolution of the assistants’ FLSA claims did not depend on an interpretation of language in the labor agreement and, therefore, the assistants were not required to arbitrate their claims. Jones v. SCO Silver Care Operations LLC (May 18, 2017).

The Court of Appeals explained that a court may compel arbitration of an FLSA claim when (1) the arbitration provision clearly and unmistakably waives the employee’s ability to vindicate federal statutory rights in court; and (2) the statute does not exclude arbitration as an appropriate forum. Here, the labor agreement’s grievance-arbitration provision did not expressly refer to FLSA or wage-hour claims, so there was no effective waiver of the right to go to court. Nonetheless, the Third Circuit recognized that even where a labor agreement’s arbitration clause fails to refer to the FLSA, the FLSA claimant may be forced to arbitrate disputes over an interpretation of a labor agreement if the FLSA claims are “inevitably intertwined with the interpretation or application” of the labor agreement.

On the issue of shift differentials, SCO Silver Care argued that the FLSA claim alleging miscalculation of the overtime rate consisted of a dispute over an implicit term of the labor agreement and whether shift differentials already include an overtime pay component. The Court rejected this argument and held that the overtime claim was governed by the FLSA, no analysis of the labor agreement’s treatment of shift differentials was required, and the Court should determine only whether the shift differentials at issue are remuneration that the FLSA requires to be included in the calculation of an employee’s regular hourly pay rate.

On the question whether the assistants’ meal breaks must be treated as hours worked, the employer argued that resolution of this issue depends on determining various meal break practices that occurred while the labor agreement was in effect and that this determination should be made by an arbitrator. The Court rejected this argument as well and found that the alleged meal break practices raised factual issues as to what work was performed during meal breaks and did not require a review of language in the labor agreement. The Court stated that the employer could not “transform these factual disputes inherent to any FLSA claim into disputes over provisions of the CBA subject to arbitration.”

If you would like to discuss how the Third Circuit’s decision affects your pay policies, arbitration clauses, wage and hour compliance program, and your business, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the Firm’s Wage and Hour Compliance Practice Group at 973-535-7129 or at pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com.

 

 

 

New York City Bans Employer Inquiries Into Salary History

On May 4, 2017, New York City Mayor Bill DeBlasio signed a law amending the New York City Human Rights Law, barring all public and private New York City employers from asking job applicants about their prior wages and salary history.  The law will take effect on Tuesday, October 31, 2017. The new law makes it an unlawful, discriminatory practice for an employer to inquire about or rely upon the salary history of a job applicant to determine their salary amount during the hiring process.

The salary inquiry law bans New York City employers from:

  • Making an inquiry, either verbally or in writing, to an applicant and/or the applicant’s current or prior employer, to obtain the applicant’s salary history;
  • Searching public records for an applicant’s salary history; and/or
  • Relying on a job applicant’s salary history when making an offer of employment or extending an employment contract to the applicant.

Salary history is broadly defined in the bill as the applicant’s “current or prior wage, benefits or other compensation.”  However, salary history inquiries do not include inquiries into the objective measure of the applicant’s productivity, for example, through inquiries on revenue, sales, or production reports.  Further, employers may still discuss the applicant’s salary and benefits expectations, including the amount of unvested equity and deferred compensation an applicant would forfeit through resignation from his or her current employment.

The law contains several other exceptions to the prohibition on salary inquiries, which include the following:

  • Employers can consider and verify an applicant’s salary history if the applicant discloses the information voluntarily and without prompting;
  • Where federal, state, or local law specifically authorizes the disclosure or verification of salary history;
  • Where salary is determined by procedures in a collective bargaining agreement;
  • When current employees are transferred or promoted within the company; and
  • When a background check for non-salary related information inadvertently discloses salary history, provided the employer does not rely on that information in making an offer of employment.

The New York City’s Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR) will be responsible for investigating complaints and enforcing the new law.  The NYCCHR will also have the authority to impose fines ranging from up to $125 for intentional violations and up to $250,000 for intentional malicious violations.

New York City employers must start to update their employment applications and train their recruiters and human resources personnel on the new requirements to ensure compliance by the October 31, 2017 deadline.  Employers may also be forced to limit the scope of their background checks and revise their notices under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

For questions on this new law, background check laws, or other employment and hiring requirements, please contact Dina M. Mastellone, Esq., Chair of the firm’s Human Resource Training & Audit Practice Group, at dmastellone@nullgenovaburns.com, or 973-533-0777.

Fate Uncertain for HHS’s Extension of ACA Discrimination Protections to Abortion & Gender Transition

In May 2016 HHS issued a final rule implementing the Affordable Care Act’s Section 1557 nondiscrimination provision, which applies to recipients of funding from HHS. The rule prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity and termination of pregnancy, as well as race, color, national origin, sex, age, and disability. The new rule has been interpreted to require covered entities to perform and provide insurance coverage for gender transitions and abortions, regardless of their contrary religious beliefs or medical judgment.

The HHS rule has been challenged in court at least twice. On December 31, 2016, the U.S. District Court in Wichita Falls, Texas enjoined nationally the portions of the rule prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity and termination of pregnancy. Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, Civil Action No. 16-cv-00108. The Order was appealed by the ACLU and the River City Gender Alliance and the appeals remain pending.

The Trump Administration has not indicated whether it will challenge the Court’s injunction and enforce the rule. The current Administration position favoring repeal of ACA in its entirety is consistent with the policy changes already made by the Trump administration. On February 22 the Departments of Education and Justice withdrew agency guidance that mandated transgender student access to restrooms consistent with gender identity. In late March President Trump appointed Roger Severino to head HHS’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) which is charged with enforcing the HHS rule. Although Severino’s appointment has been controversial, as yet there is no indication from the OCR as to its enforcement position under new HHS leadership.

In the only other reported case brought under the rule’s prohibition of discrimination based on gender identity, on December 6, 2016 the U.S. District Court in Oakland, California stayed further proceedings in a case challenging an employer’s denial of gender transition health coverage. Robinson v. Dignity Health, Civil Action No. 16-cv-3035. The stay was granted pending the outcome of Gloucester County School Bd. v. G.G., a case scheduled for hearing before the Supreme Court. However, on March 6 the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Justice’s and Education’s withdrawal of guidance on February 22.  The California court has continued the stay in the Robinson v. Dignity Health case based on the pending bankruptcy of the plaintiff and scheduled the next hearing for May 19.

The Supreme Court’s action suggests that courts across the country may be taking a “kick the can down the road” approach on the Section 1557 rule as the Trump Administration has promised to repeal and replace ACA, or alternatively that the Court prefers to review the case only when the Court is back to full strength. Currently, the HHS rule’s provisions relating to gender identity and termination of pregnancy remain enjoined nationally.

If you have any questions or would like to discuss how the Section 1557 rule affects you or your business, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq. at 973-535-7129 or pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com, Gina M. Schneider, Esq. at 973-535-7134 or gmschneider@nullgenovaburns.com or Ryann M. Aaron, Esq. at 973-387-7812 or raaron@nullgenovaburns.com.