Appellate Division Rules Independent Contractor Agreements Signed by Driver’s Corporation Not Bullet Proof Against Class Action Overtime and Wage Deduction Claims

On October 29, 2018 a N.J. Appellate Division panel reversed a dismissal of class action overtime pay claims brought against a freight-forwarding company that convinced the lower court that the company’s drivers and deliverers lacked standing to sue because they signed independent contractor agreements to provide services through their separate corporations. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division found that the court below prematurely ended its inquiry into whether the plaintiff was an employee or an independent contractor, and directed the lower court to look beyond the terms of the contract to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the drivers and the company.  Veras v. Interglobo North America, Inc., et al., Docket No. A-3313-16T1 (Oct. 29, 2018).

In 2014, Raymond Veras, through his corporation J&K Trucking Solution, signed a “Contractor Lease Agreement” (CLA) with Interglobo and then provided driver services to Interglobo.  He claimed that he routinely worked in excess of 40 hours each week but received no overtime pay, and that Interglobo took illegal deductions from his pay. In 2015 he filed a class action under the N.J. Wage and Hour Law (WHL) and the Wage Payment Law (WPL) against two Interglobo entities. The CLA clearly stated that J&K was an independent delivery operator. However, Veras’s complaint alleged that, despite the CLA which his corporation signed, he was an employee protected by the WHL and WPL since he took direction from Interglobo and its employees, wore its uniforms, dealt with its customers’ invoices, and was subject to discipline and termination by Interglobo.

The lower court dismissed Veras’s complaint on the grounds that he lacked standing to bring the action. The Appellate Division reversed and held that the A-B-C test articulated by the N.J. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Hargrove v. Sleepy’s applied to determine whether Veras’ relationship with Interglobo was that of an employee as opposed to an independent contractor. The Appellate Division held that “a court is not limited to the terms of the contract between the parties” and the court should review “the substance, not the form of the relationship … to determine if [the relationship] is exempt from the WPL and WHL.”

The A-B-C test presumes that a service provider is an employee, unless the service recipient can prove A, B and C: (A) the service provider is free from direction or control by the service recipient, (B) the services rendered to the recipient are outside the recipient’s usual course of business, or are performed outside all places of the recipient’s business, and (C) the service provider is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business.

Interglobo argued that the A-B-C test did not apply because Veras’s employer was his own corporation, J&K Trucking Solution, and under the economic realities test, Interglobo was not the employer. The court rejected this argument, too, and held that the economic realities test does not apply to WHL and WPL claims.

The Appellate Division held that the A-B-C test applied to Veras regardless of whether the CLA was signed by Veras as an individual or by his corporation, and stated that the A-B-C test presumes that Veras was an employee, not an independent contractor. The Appellate Division reasoned that even if the economic realities test did apply, dismissal of the complaint at the motion to dismiss stage was not warranted solely because of the CLA, because this test is fact-intensive, and courts rarely decide a worker’s status on a summary judgment motion, let alone on a motion to dismiss before discovery is taken.

Ultimately, this Appellate Division panel decided that the mere fact that the service provider’s corporation, and not the driver himself, signed an independent contractor agreement with the service recipient was not dispositive of the issue of employee versus independent contractor status at the motion to dismiss stage, and the underlying facts must be examined to determine whether, despite the contract, the service provider is an employee and has standing to sue the service recipient under the WHL or the WPL.  As businesses attempt to create more separateness between themselves and their service providers, this court cautions that employee status will not depend on the existence of a contract alone, but will be analyzed under the rigorous A-B-C test.

For more information on this court development, wage and hour law compliance, or independent contractor agreements, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the firm’s Labor Law, Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation, Immigration Law and Wage and Hour Compliance Practice Groups, at PMcGovern@nullgenovaburns.com.

U.S. Supreme Court’s Epic Decision Validates Class Action Waivers

On May 21 the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the question whether the National Labor Relations Act prevents an employer from enforcing an employee’s contractual waiver of the right to sue the employer on a class or collective basis. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that arbitration agreements requiring the processing of claims one-by-one and prohibiting class actions must be enforced, and neither the Federal Arbitration Act’s saving clause nor the National Labor Relations Act “permits this Court to declare the parties’ agreements unlawful.”  Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis; Ernst & Young v. Morris; NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.

In each of these three cases, the employee signed a contract mandating the resolution of workplace disputes through arbitration on an individualized basis, and later brought collective action claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid wages.  In seeking to void their class action waivers, the employees relied on the NLRB’s 2012 decision in D. R. Horton, Inc. and also argued that the FAA’s savings clause allowed the Court to deny enforcement of the arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”

In the D. R. Horton case, the NLRB ruled that the NLRA effectively nullified the FAA in cases where an employer seeks to compel arbitration of employee claims on an individual basis only, by expanding the definition of “concerted activity” to include the right to bring a class or collective action. The NLRB ruled that an agreement not to bring a class or collective action is unenforceable as violative of the NLRA, even though waivers of other NLRA rights are enforceable.

The Court majority rejected the NLRB’s holding and held that the NLRA focuses on the rights to organize unions and bargain collectively. The Court commented that it “has never read a right to class actions into the NLRA – and for three quarters of a century neither did the [NLRB].” Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, reasoned that it is “pretty unlikely” that the NLRA was intended to protect the right to bring class or collective actions, especially since the NLRA makes no mention of them, and as recently as 2010 the NLRB’s General Counsel opined that the NLRA does not protect these rights.

The Court also relied on the FAA’s policy favoring arbitration agreements and legal precedent acknowledging the “unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts.” To hold all such provisions unenforceable, the Court stated, would cause arbitration to “wind up looking like the litigation it was meant to displace.”

This sweeping decision will likely eliminate some of the reservations and indecision that the employer community has had regarding including in their new employee orientation paperwork agreements requiring arbitration of employment-related claims on an individual basis only.

For more information regarding the value that mandatory arbitration agreements and class action waivers may add to your organization and how to design and roll out arbitration procedures that will survive legal challenge, please contact one of the Partners in the firm’s Labor Law Practice Group: James J. McGovern III, Esq., at jmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com, Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., at pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com, Douglas E. Solomon, Esq. at dsolomon@nullgenovaburns.com, or John R. Vreeland, Esq., at jvreeland@nullgenovaburns.com  — or call us at 973.533.0777.

DACA Program Preoccupies Courts and Confounds Congress

Since September 2017 when the Trump Administration announced the termination of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program (DACA), litigation and Congressional inertia have contributed to the creation of an uncertain future for DACA Program enrollees. On January 9, a federal district court enjoined the Administration from ending DACA on March 5, 2018, and at least until the case makes its way through litigation. This decision prompted the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to restart the DACA program, which currently means that DACA program enrollees whose status expired on or after September 5, 2016 may now file a renewal application. Further, DACA program enrollees whose DACA status expired or terminated prior to September 5, 2016 may file new DACA applications. The order does not, however, allow new applications by persons who never had DACA status and does not permit persons in the DACA Program to travel outside the U.S. in advance parole status.

The Department of Justice appealed the federal court’s order, and the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear the Justice Department’s appeal on an expedited basis, which allows the Court to issue a decision by mid-February. The Court also ruled that the Department of Homeland Security is not required to turn over documents relating to the Administration’s decision to end DACA, at least for now.

Meanwhile, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals is reviewing an order by a federal district court in Brooklyn that allows the court to review the Administration’s decision to terminate the DACA program.

While these DACA program-related cases proceed through the courts, Congress is attempting to legislate a resolution. A bipartisan group of Senators sent a DACA proposal to the President who rejected it, reportedly because it failed to end the family preferences provisions of current immigration law Most recently, 30 Democrats joined their Republican counterparts to end a three-day government shutdown by passing a temporary spending bill, but failed to negotiate a deal on DACA.  Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell committed to bring a DACA bill to the Senate floor if DACA and border security legislation has not been passed by the Senate by February 8 when the current funding legislation expires.

For questions about the DACA Program and how it could affect your employees and your business, contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the firm’s Immigration Law Practice Group, at pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com, or by phone at 973-535-7129.

Republican Majority at NLRB Brings Important Pro-Employer Decisions

The recent, temporary Republican majority at the NLRB brought several important changes to Board decisions issued during the Obama Administration. In early December Republican appointees of President Trump briefly held a majority of the seats on the Board. This status continued until December 16 when Board Chairman Miscimarra’s resignation took effect. However, in the weeks leading up to Miscimarra’s resignation, the three Republican Board members penned pro-employer decisions that for the most part return to Board precedent in effect prior to 2009. On December 22, 2017, President Trump appointed Board Member Marvin E. Kaplan as Acting Board Chairman. The President is expected to nominate management labor attorney John Ring to fill the vacancy created by Miscimarra’s resignation. But before Miscimarra exited, the Republican-majority issued several decisions that rolled back prior Board precedent and set the stage for more pro-employer decisions. A few examples are as follows.

On December 14, the Board issued two decisions, Boeing Co. and Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, that address facially neutral workplace rules and the joint employer standard.  In Boeing, the Board revisited the 13-year old Lutheran Heritage standard which held that an employer that maintains a facially neutral workplace rule commits an unfair labor practice if an employee would reasonably construe the rule as prohibiting Section 7 activity. In Boeing, the company issued a workplace rule that prohibited cameras at work. The Board held that the Lutheran Heritage standard, under which the anti-camera rule was unlawful, failed to consider legitimate justifications for the polices, rules, and handbook provisions challenged. The Board found it particularly problematic that prior decisions applying the Lutheran Heritage standard found unlawful employer directives that employees “work harmoniously” and conduct themselves in a “positive and professional manner.”  In Boeing the Board announced it will now apply a two-pronged test that considers (i) the nature and extent of the rule’s potential impact on employee Section 7 rights and (ii) the employer’s legitimate justifications for the rule.

Also on December 14 the Board overruled the joint employer standard announced in its 2015 Browning-Ferris decision, which decreed that “even when two entities have never exercised joint control over essential terms and conditions of employment, and even when any joint control is not ‘direct and immediate,’ the two entities will still be joint employers based on the mere existence of ‘reserved’ joint control, or based on indirect control or control that is ‘limited and routine.’” In Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, the Board held that a finding of joint employer status now requires proof that putative joint employers have actually exercised control over essential employment terms, and that the control is direct and immediate, not limited or routine.

On December 15, Miscimarra’s last day on the job, the NLRB issued two more pro-employer decisions — Raytheon Network Centric Systems and PCC Structurals, Inc.  In Raytheon, the Board revisited the Supreme Court’s 1962 decision in NLRB v. Katz and the case law applying Katz. The Court in Katz held that Section 8(a)(5) of the Act prohibits employers from making a change in mandatory bargaining subjects unless the employer gives the union advance notice and an opportunity to bargain over the proposed change. Later NLRB case law held that an employer may lawfully take unilateral action so long as it “does not alter the status quo.”  Raytheon provided an opportunity for the Board to clarify what constitutes a “change” from the “status quo” and to revisit the Board’s 2016 holding in E.I. du Pont de Nemours which re-defined what constitutes a “change” requiring notice to the union and bargaining prior to implementation. In DuPont the Board ruled that even if an employer continued to do precisely what it did for decades pursuant to a CBA, and even if the CBA permitted the employer’s past actions, once the CBA expires, taking the same action constitutes a “change.” Furthermore, if the employer’s action involved discretion and the employer took discretionary action, under DuPont this exercise of discretion was a “change.” In Raytheon the Board overruled DuPont as fundamentally flawed. The Board concluded that “an employer’s past practice constitutes a term and condition of employment that permits the employer to take actions unilaterally that do not materially vary in kind or degree from what has been customary in the past.” In Raytheon the Board held that since the employer routinely changed its employees’ benefits, premiums, deductibles, and copayments for health insurance in the past, Raytheon did not violate the Act when it made similar changes after the CBA expired. The Board held that its decision applied retroactively, but also cautioned this its holding had no effect on a union’s right to demand bargaining over mandatory bargaining issues.

On December 15 the Board returned to the prior standard for determining when a proposed unit is appropriate for collective bargaining. PCC Structurals Inc. The Board overruled its 2011 decision in Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile and returned to its prior “community of interests” standard. The Board criticized the Specialty Healthcare standard for transferring too much responsibility from the Board to the organizing parties and deferring to the petitioned-for unit in all but a few narrow, highly unusual circumstances. In reverting to the community of interests standard, the Board stated, “It is the Board’s responsibility to determine unit appropriateness based on a careful examination of the community of interests of employees both within and outside the proposed unit.” Accordingly, employers will have greater participation in the determination of an appropriate unit for a union election. Conversely, union organizers are expected to have less success in gerrymandering the unit to conform to the employee groups they are targeting.

More pro-management changes are expected once the fifth Board member is confirmed. For example, the Board may revisit its blocking charge policy, which delays a union decertification election when a union files an unfair labor practice charge and essentially keeps the employees in the union until the election occurs, regardless of the charge’s merits.

For more information about how the changes at the NLRB affect unionization efforts at your company or your company’s implementation of work rules, policies or procedures, please contact one of the partners in the firm’s Labor Law Practice Group — James J. McGovern III, Esq., at jmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com, Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., at pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com, Douglas E. Solomon, Esq. at dsolomon@nullgenovaburns.com, or John R. Vreeland, Esq., at jvreeland@nullgenovaburns.com  — or call us at 973-533-0777.

Third Time’s The Charm for Trump Travel Ban

On December 4 the U.S. Supreme Court cleared the way for the third version of President Trump’s travel ban to take effect, staying injunctions handed down by two U.S. District Courts in October. The Administration’s latest travel ban indefinitely suspends travel to the U.S. by nationals of Somalia, Syria, Libya, Iran, Yemen, North Korea, and Chad and certain officials of the Venezuelan government. Justices Ginsberg and Sotomayor dissented from the Court’s decision.

In two separate orders, the Court stayed injunctions granted by the Courts in Hawaii and Maryland. On October 17 the Maryland District Court issued a nationwide injunction blocking implementation of the ban, finding a likelihood of success on claims that the ban exceeds the President’s authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and violates the Establishment Clause. The injunction protected only individuals with a bona fide relationship with a person or entity physically located in the U.S., such as immediate family members, and did not block the restrictions on U.S. entry by North Koreans and Venezuelans.

Three days later, the District Court in Hawaii issued a nationwide temporary restraining order finding a likelihood that the Plaintiffs would prevail on their claims under the INA. While the Court completely enjoined implementation of the ban with respect to persons traveling from the six Muslim majority countries, in November the Ninth Circuit pared the TRO back to protect only those with a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the U.S. This includes “close familial relationships” which, according to the Ninth Circuit, include grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins.

In the latest development, the Trump administration argued to the Supreme Court that the third version of the ban is the result of an extensive review process designed to ensure that foreign national travelers do not pose a risk to national security. The Administration contends that anything but a complete stay of the lower court orders would undermine national security since “most immigrant-visa holders have a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”

The Supreme Court apparently agreed, reconsidered its analysis of the prior version of the travel ban, and allowed the ban to take full effect while its legality is reviewed by the lower courts. Oral arguments are scheduled before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on December 6. The Maryland case will be argued before the 4th Circuit on December 8. At this time, there is no appeal pending before the Supreme Court relating to any version of the travel ban, but eventual Supreme Court review of travel ban 3.0 is likely.

If you would like to discuss the implications of the travel ban and the various court decisions affecting the ban for your employees, your hiring plans, and your business, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the Firm’s Immigration Law Practice at 973-535-7129 or at pmcgovern@nullnullgenovaburns.com.

September 18 Deadline Set By U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for Employers to Use Revised Form I-9

Currently, every employer that recruits, hires, or refers employees for a fee in the U.S. is required to complete the Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification process within three days of a new employee’s hiring.  On July 17 the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services approved a revised version of Form I-9.

The revised Form I-9 changes the prior form by, among other things, adding Consular Reports of Birth Abroad to the List of Acceptable Documents. Two other clarifications relate to the timing of completion. First, Section 1 of Form I-9 must be completed no later than the first day of employment, as opposed to a previous command that it must be completed “no later than the end of the first day of employment.” Second, persons employed for fewer than three days must present their original I-9 documentation to the employer no later than the first day of employment. The employer must still complete its review of the employee’s employment eligibility documentation within three business days of hiring.

No later than September 18, 2017, all U.S. employers must use the new Form 1-9.  Employers may continue using the prior Form I-9 through September 17, 2017 but should prepare to modify their hiring process to include the revised Form I-9.  Alternatively, employers may choose to use the new Form I-9 right away.  For any existing Form I-9s, employers must continue to comply with the existing separate filing and document retention rules.

The new Form I-9, its instructions, supplements, and translations are available for download here.

For any questions on the new Form I-9 and the I-9 employment eligibility verification process, contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the firm’s Labor Law Practice Group, at pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com, or by phone at 973-535-7129.

Hawaii Court Enjoins Trump Travel Ban For Excluding Non-Immediate Family Members of US Persons and DHS-Approved Refugees

In June the Supreme Court enforced temporarily President Trump’s travel ban to the extent it excludes persons without a “bona fide relationship” to a person or entity in the U.S. The Court expressly identified wives and mothers-in-law as persons who have a bona fide family relationship to a person in the U.S.  Following the Court’s decision, the Trump administration interpreted “bona fide relationship” narrowly, to include only fiancés, spouses, children, parents and siblings of the U.S. person. On July 13 a federal judge in Hawaii loosened the travel ban by entering a nationwide injunction that orders the Trump administration to exempt from the ban grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the U.S. U.S. District Judge Derrick Watson criticized the Administration’s narrow definition of bona fide family relationship as “the antithesis of common sense,” which “dictates that close family members be defined to include grandparents.”

Additionally, Judge Watson enjoined enforcement of the ban to the extent it excludes from entry refugees who have formal assurance from a U.S. resettlement agency. Judge Watson reasoned that such assurance “meets each of the Supreme Court’s touchstones: it is formal, it is a documented contract, it is binding, it triggers responsibilities and obligations, including compensation, it is issued specific to an individual refugee only when that refugee has been approved for entry by the Department of Homeland Security, and it is issued in the ordinary course, and historically has been for decades…Bona fide does not get any more bona fide than that.”

Immediately, the Justice Department appealed Judge Watson’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit and simultaneously filed motion papers with the Supreme Court requesting clarification. In its motion, the Justice Department argues that Judge Watson’s interpretation of the travel ban “empties the Court’s decision of meaning,” because it includes “not just ‘close’ family members, but virtually all family members…Treating all of these relationships as ‘close familial relationship[s]’ reads the term ‘close’ out of the Court’s decision.” The Justice Department asked the Court to stay the effective date of the Hawaii court’s order until the Court resolved the motion to clarify the Court’s June ruling. The Justice Department’s motion, which remains pending, may be viewed here.

If you would like to discuss the implications of the travel ban and the various court decisions affecting the ban for your employees, your hiring plans, and your business, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the Firm’s Immigration Law Practice at 973-535-7129 or at pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com.

Jersey City’s PLA Ordinance Found Preempted by NLRA and ERISA and Void Ab Initio

On June 15 U.S. District Court Judge Wigenton determined that Jersey City’s ordinance, in effect since 2007 and providing for tax abatements for real estate developers that sign Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act and void ab initio. The Jersey City Ordinance mandated that tax abatement recipients sign PLAs that contain no-strike and no-lockout provisions and therefore Jersey City’s Ordinance “directly intrudes on §7 and §8 of the NLRA.” The Court also held that the PLA ordinance’s attempt to regulate the operation and reporting of apprenticeship programs intruded upon and therefore was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Associated Builders and Contractors Inc. v. Jersey City, No. 14-5445 (D.N.J. 2017).

This order is the most recent development in the action’s two-year history, as the case has bounced from court to court. In August 2015 the Contractors association, made up of non-union or “merit shop” contractors, brought suit alleging that Jersey City’s PLA ordinance was preempted by federal law. In August 2015 the District Court dismissed the complaint finding that Jersey City acted as a market participant, and not as a market regulator, and therefore the federal preemption doctrine did not apply to the ordinance. An appeal to the Third Circuit followed and in June 2016 the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that Jersey City was, in fact, a market regulator in its enforcement of the PLA ordinance. The Third Circuit found that the preemption analysis should be applied to the ordinance and remanded the case back to the District Court to apply the preemption analysis. Associated Builders & Contractors Inc. v. Jersey City (3d Cir. 2016). On remand, the Contractors association moved the District Court for judgment on the pleadings. Judge Wigenton granted the motion, voided the ordinance ab initio and ruled that “enforcement of the PLA Ordinance on any tax-abated project is enjoined.”

The practical impact of this ruling is to level the playing field for non-union and unionized developers and construction contractors competing for work on tax-abated projects. The Contractors association claimed that the PLA ordinance had the effects of setting 100% of the tax-abatement project work aside for 15% of the construction workforce, and driving up construction costs, which Jersey City’s taxpayers had to bear in the form of tax abatements. Now, Jersey City cannot require developers or construction contractors to sign PLAs with the Hudson County Building and Construction Trades Council in exchange for tax abatements and the opportunity to work on tax-abated projects. The Court voided the PLA ordinance ab initio, not prospectively. This suggests that on tax-abated projects that are now under way with PLAs in place, general contractors will revisit the process for selecting subcontractors with more discretion to select non-union subcontractors to perform project work.

Also an open question is how Judge Wigenton’s decision will affect similar tax-abatement ordinances in other municipalities that impose PLA requirements. Questions relating to this important decision and the path forward for developers and contractors in Jersey City and elsewhere in the state may be directed to any partner in our firm’s Labor Law Practice Group – James McGovern III, Patrick McGovern, Douglas Solomon, and John Vreeland.

SCOTUS Lifts Injunctions Against Trump Travel Ban for Aliens Unable to Establish Bona Fide Relationship with a U.S. Person or Entity

On June 26, the Supreme Court granted the Trump Administration’s petitions for certiorari and agreed to review next term the Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ decisions that affirmed broad injunctions against enforcement of the President’s second Executive Order on U.S. entry by foreign nationals. In the meantime, in a per curiam decision, the Court granted in part the Administration’s request to lift the lower courts’ injunctions against the travel ban affecting nationals of six predominantly Muslim countries, the 50,000-person refugee cap, and the suspension of the refugee program “with respect to foreign nationals who lack any bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” The Court will hear argument on these consolidated cases in October 2017.

The Supreme Court left in place the lower courts’ injunctions “only with respect to parties similarly situated to Doe, Dr. Elshikh, and Hawaii. In practical terms, this means that §2(c) [of the second Executive Order] may not be enforced against foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. All other foreign nationals are subject to the provisions of EO-2.”

The Court defined “bona fide relationship” as including individuals with a “close familial relationship,” including a wife or a mother-in-law. For entities, the relationship “must be formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading EO-2.”  This category includes a student who has been admitted to a U.S. university, a person who accepted a job offer with a U.S. employer, and a lecturer invited to address an American audience. The Court stated that the same “bona fide relationship” test will apply to a foreign national who seeks entry to the U.S. as a refugee, regardless of the 50,000- person cap.

Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Thomas stated that he would “grant the government’s applications for a stay in their entirety” and agreed “with the Court’s implicit conclusion that the Government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits—that is, that the judgments below will be reversed.” The Administration can therefore rely on at least three solid votes to overturn the injunctions in their entirety next fall.

If you would like to discuss the current status of the President’s Executive Order, and the implications of the Executive Order and the Court’s decision for your employees, your hiring plans, and your business, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the Firm’s Immigration Law Practice at 973-535-7129 or at pmcgovern@nullgenovaburns.com.

Fourth and Ninth Circuits Sink Trump Travel Ban as Prelude to High Court Review

In the most recent judicial setbacks to President Trump’s Executive Order earlier this year suspending the U.S. entry of aliens from six Muslim-majority countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen), reducing the number of refugees allowed entry in 2017 to 50,000, indefinitely and then temporarily barring the admission of Syrian refugees, and suspending the Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days, on May 25 the Fourth Circuit en banc enjoined nationally enforcement of the Executive Order. Although the Justice Department argued that the Order’s primary purpose is advancing national security, the court, with three of the 14 judges dissenting, remained unconvinced that the travel ban had “more to do with national security than it does with effectuating the President’s promised Muslim ban.” The Fourth Circuit found that the Order “speaks with vague words of national security, but in context drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination.” The opinion referenced statements that President Trump made in 2016 while on the campaign trail, which the court found supported its finding that the Executive Order was religiously motivated and violated the Constitution’s Establishment Clause. However, the court vacated the lower court’s injunction to the extent it enjoined the President. International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump.

On June 12 the Ninth Circuit in a per curiam decision by a three-judge panel, also upheld a lower court’s nationwide injunction against enforcement of the travel ban, but on the separate grounds that the Executive Order violated U.S. immigration law. The court stated that the revised travel ban “exceeded the scope of authority delegated to [the President] by Congress.” The panel held that by broadly prohibiting entry by all persons from the listed countries, the Executive Order is too broad and ignores important factors, such as the alien’s working arrangements, family matters and access to U.S. medical care. The Ninth Circuit did not address Establishment Clause issues, as the Fourth Circuit did. Instead, its major concern was that “the order does not provide a rationale explaining why permitting entry of nationals from the six designated countries under current protocols would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” However, the court vacated the injunction against the President and against the Government’s conducting internal reviews of security risks posed by nationals of the listed countries and the refugee program. Hawaii v. Trump.

The Supreme Court must now decide whether to hear the Administration’s appeal from the Courts of Appeals decisions this term. Most recently, in view of the current non-enforcement of the travel ban, on June 14 the President revised the 90-day ban on travelers and the 120-day ban on refugees to ensure they do not expire in the interim and will take effect 72 hours if and after the Administration prevails in having the injunctions lifted.

If you would like to discuss the implications of the Executive Order and these court decisions for your employees, your hiring plans, and your business, please contact Patrick W. McGovern, Esq., Partner in the Firm’s Immigration Law Practice at 973-535-7129 or at pmcgovern@nulllgenovaburns.com.